

Indonesian nationalism discourse on YouTube video produced by young Chinese-Indonesians

Daniel Susilo and Rahma Sugihartati

Abstract

YouTube, as a new social media platform, has become “viral” in Indonesia since 2010. Many Indonesian youths have become popular as YouTubers (users of YouTube who actively upload videos on YouTube). Data from Google Marketing indicate that Indonesia is the country with the largest population by viewing time on YouTube in the Asia Pacific in 2015. YouTube is also the most viewed social media site in Indonesia (data by Alexa.com, 2016). One of the famous Indonesian YouTube channels is Last Day Production (also known as LDP), which regularly uploads situational dramas, skits, and parodies. All of the cast members in LDP videos are young Chinese-Indonesians under 30 years old.

On the eve of Indonesian National Day of 2016, LDP uploaded the video entitled *Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia* (Stereotypes of Indonesian Youths). The video portrayed how Indonesian youth now envisage their nationalism. LDP created this video in collaboration with young famous Indonesian YouTubers and musicians such as Eka Gustiwana, Aulion, and Kevin Anggara. This video later trended in Indonesia around August 2016. This article uses the approach of cyberculture theory and utilizes visualizing methods. Unit analyses of this research are the viral video, text, music, and whatever else the LDP have portrayed in the video.

Keywords: Indonesian nationalism, YouTube. Chinese-Indonesian

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Introduction

The new millennium in Indonesia saw the shift of nationalism discourse: from heroic and oratory discourse to digital media discourse (Heryanto, 2008). For example, during the high tension of Indonesia–Malaysia relations in 2005, many invoked slogans such as *Ganyang Malaysia*.¹ In 2008–2012, Facebook, the social media platform developed by Mark Zuckerberg, became popular and viral among Indonesian citizens, indicated by the increasing internet penetration during this era. Many Indonesian youths were curious about Facebook, and it accelerated the internet usage rate in Indonesia, especially in the mobile internet market. In 2010, YouTube, a social media platform specializing in self-broadcast video service, gained a significant number of users in Indonesia. Indonesian youths saw YouTube as a chance to represent what they previously were unable to broadcast through mainstream media such as television or radio. The creative industry in YouTube has grown, and many Indonesian YouTubers have become popular for Indonesian youth, including the Chinese-Indonesian YouTuber of Last Day Production (popularly known as LDP).

Chinese-Indonesians make up at least 3 percent of Indonesia's total population, based on official government statistic (Suryadinata, 2001). Aside from their small number, Chinese-Indonesians are also labelled as a “double minority” because most Chinese-Indonesians are non-Muslim who live in a predominantly Muslim-Indonesian nation (Purdey, 2006). They are mostly Christian, Buddhist, or traditional Chinese, and only a small number of them are Muslim. The double minority label of Chinese-Indonesians is also mentioned by previous research, especially in Asian studies² (Aspinall, 2005; Heryanto & Mandal, 2003; Hadiz & Robison, 2013; Kusno, 2003; Panggabean & Smith, 2011; Suryadinata, 2001; Wibowo, 2001).

The Chinese population in Indonesia significantly increased during the Dutch colonial era (Heryanto & Mandal, 2003). Then they were banned from demonstrating and practicing their identity and culture under the Suharto era, dubbed as “Orde Baru” or New Order. Heryanto and Mandal (2003) state that many Chinese-Indonesians were oppressed during this era because of their ethnicity. Citizens of Chinese descent were required to carry and present documentation beyond the ordinary to obtain access to public services, compared to those of non-Chinese ethnicity. Suharto's presidency terms can be equated as “The Indonesian Marcos,” who considered the Chinese identity in Chinese-Indonesians as a threat to his regime's stability (Aspinall, 2005; Hadiz & Robison, 2013). Moreover, according to Purdey (2006) and Chua (as cited in Koning, 2011, p. 113), the oppression became worse during and after the 1998 Asian financial crisis. In times of economic or political turmoil, Chinese-Indonesians have often been the targets of

local frustration (Kusno, 2003; Panggabean & Smith, 2011; Wibowo, 2001). In May 1998, Chinese-owned shops and houses were burned down and Chinese Indonesian women raped (Blackburn, 1999; Wibowo, 2001). This “Chinese” card was played in order to “direct the anger of the people away from the government and towards defenseless Indonesians of Chinese origin” (Chua as cited in Koning, 2011, p. 113). Suharto used this strategy many times during his reign to establish a seeming “stability” in national politics.

In Suharto’s era, the level of wealth of Chinese-Indonesians was mostly above average (Mackie, 2008). In most cities, shops and stores were mostly owned and operated by Chinese-Indonesians. This triggered a sensitive issue; that Chinese-Indonesians indeed owned or controlled most of the country’s economy. Suharto also stirred negative prejudice against Chinese-Indonesians under the guise of “nationalism” (Turner, 2003; Turner & Allen, 2007). Based on this negative prejudice, the government then created a regulation to push the Chinese-Indonesians to change their names to Indonesian-sounding names such as Halim, Abdul, Limanto, Limantara, Angkawijaya, Ongko, and others, as long as it “sounded” Indonesian (Bailey & Lie, 2013). Most Chinese-Indonesians recently never used their Chinese name in the public sphere despite the end of the New Order in 1998 in the first place. This policy forced Chinese-Indonesians to get rid of their Chinese identity to be “more nationalist,” even though they have been living for more than three generations in Indonesia. Chinese-Indonesians also had limitations on their public sphere appearances, except in the obituary space in the newspapers (Aizawa, 2011; Lan, 2018; Susanto, 2010).

During Suharto’s era, the dominance of Chinese-Indonesians on media was severely limited. Some Chinese-Indonesians still held the ownership of media that can be traced back to media ownership policy in Sukarno’s era (Hwang & Sadiq, 2010; Sen & Hill, 2006). Suharto restrained Chinese-Indonesian cinema and film industry ownership and allowed Indian-Indonesians to take over the ownership. Chinese-Indonesian producers got labelled as *non-pribumi* (non-Indonesian native) who never really understood Indonesian values on film (Barker, 2014).

After Suharto’s fall, the regime’s treatment toward Chinese-Indonesians started to change, and many Chinese-Indonesians started to repractice and reintroduce their identity in public. The dragon dance (also known as *Barongsay*) was once again allowed to be performed in public. Many Chinese-Indonesians also became public politicians such as Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) and his brother, Basuri Tjahaja Purnama, Kwik Kian Gie, and Marie Elka Pangestu. The fall of Suharto also triggered many Chinese-Indonesians youths to access larger education support in the public sector.

Previously, during the New Order regime, Chinese-Indonesians tended to avoid politics, citizenship, or nationalism issues; recently they have become more active in showing their nationalism. Daniel Mananta, a famous Chinese-Indonesian TV presenter, launched his t-shirt fashion outlet with the brand “Damn, I Love Indonesia,” which became popular among Indonesian youth in representing their nationalism.

After living in the long history under Suharto’s authoritarianism, Chinese-Indonesians public presence in media also shifted to alternative media such as video-sharing websites and applications like YouTube. Almost 70 percent of famous Indonesian YouTubers are Chinese-Indonesian. This domination of Chinese-Indonesian YouTubers can be traced back on YouTube’s characteristic as an alternative to TV (Ha, 2018), free to access, and easy to spread around the world (Thelwall, 2018). These features unusually occur for Chinese-Indonesians because they could not access traditional media like TV due to the limitations imposed on them during Suharto’s repressive regime.

Last Day Production, also known as LDP, is one of the most famous Indonesian YouTube video makers. All of its members of Chinese-Indonesian ethnicity. LDP intends to transform its idea on YouTube as a video streaming website with a broader impact on the world. During the eve of Indonesian National Day in 2016, LDP released a video titled *Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia* (Stereotypes of Indonesian Youths) (LASTDAY Productions, 2016), which describes Chinese-Indonesians as an integral part of Indonesia and indeed are a part of Indonesian millennials. Austerberry (2013) addresses the streaming media as the new media with an exciting addition to the wealthy media producers’ toolbox. In the current situation, cinema and radio were ousted by the television as the primary mass communication medium, and streaming is set to transform the World Wide Web.

This article will investigate the activity of Chinese-Indonesian youths in the video titled *Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia*. This video, as previously mentioned, reached number 1 on Indonesian YouTube’s trending video and can be considered as counterdiscourse in the rise of the Islamic populist movement in Indonesia. The author wishes to disclose that he has no relationship with LDP in any form whatsoever in the writing of this article.

Methods

Videos on YouTube have become objects of research. Chris Barker (2003) states that the center stand of study in cultural studies is about representation and how the meaning is constructed and generated. Cultural representation can be examined by sound, image, and how the text produced in a specific

context (Barker, 2003). Another research study by Haiqing Yu (2009) indicates that research on media transformation is always at the same time within the context of cultural and social changes. The key to understanding media changes research is to eliminate the dichotomies of media production and consumption (Yu, 2009).

Carole Gray and Julian Malins (2004) note that research in the arts is emerging to define a personal creative construction, especially to reposition the multimethod technique of an individual project. Barthes's semiotic understanding is used for this research to redefine the meaning of signs and symbols from this video. To help the researcher further complete the analysis, social construction theory from Berger is used as complementary methods for analyzing the idea behind the video.

The material of this research is the video of LDP, *Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia*, which can be accessed on YouTube using this link: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=66lkugJn06M> (LASTDAY Productions, 2016). This video, 4 minutes and 56 seconds long, was uploaded on August 17, 2016, during the Indonesian National Day of 2016.

Chinese Indonesian Identity and Contemporary Issues

During the New Order, someone who looks Chinese was labelled as not fully Indonesian (Heryanto, 2015). Specifically, in ethnicity, Paul Tickell (as cited in Heryanto, 2015) notes that the Chinese identity looks unseen, and it is a taboo to be in public discourse. In relation with the nationalism issue, Chinese-Indonesians are labeled as non-nationalist, merely due to their physical appearance that "looks different" from the native Indonesian, especially not Javanese-looking, and the old stories about Chinese nationalism of the Sun Yat-Sen Era (Stutje, 2015). Benedict Anderson (as cited in Barker, 2003) states that construction of nationalism crosses wide tracts of time and space.

Chinese identity became easy and convenient to forget in its fictiveness during social conversation (Heryanto, 2008). Chinese-Indonesians do not become a truly "Indonesian citizen" on the same social and cultural respect or legal protection, especially under the New Order era (Heryanto, 2008). It is too difficult for Chinese-Indonesians to access public education or become a public servant due to their status and identity as Chinese-Indonesians (Heryanto, 2008). There was a little quota for Chinese-Indonesians to enter the state university, and they were still labeled as not truly Indonesian (Heryanto, 2008; Koning, 2011).

Another issue about the citizenship of Chinese-Indonesians is the difficulty in getting a passport as an official public document. They were obliged to show the SBKRI ("Surat Bukti Kewarganegaraan Republik

Indonesia”—Letter of Declaration of Indonesian Citizenship) as a requirement for any legal document administration (Heryanto, 2008). In their birth certificates, Chinese-Indonesians also get a special code number for identification if they have Chinese ethnic backgrounds (Dharmasaputra as cited in Heryanto, 2008).

As a minority, Chinese-Indonesians suffered racial discrimination during the New Order regime. Chinese language (Mandarin), schools, media, organizations, and also festivals were banned (Heryanto, 2006). Chinese-Indonesians were also labeled as a disintegration threat to Indonesian unity (Heryanto, 2006). For van Dijk and Kaptein (2016), Chinese-Indonesians experienced hate and rejection from the radical Islamic groups. Van Dijk and Kaptein (2016) describe how radical Islamic elements are rejecting and even have become violent toward some Chinese temples and churches.

Based on their atrocious experiences in the past, Chinese-Indonesians became closed off and afraid to show their identity of Chinese background. After the authoritarian regime fell, Chinese-Indonesians regained their rights to show their identity as Chinese, shown by the openly public celebrations of Chinese traditions such as Chinese New Year and dragon dance. During the era of Wahid as president, many young Chinese and Chinese scholars obtained positions in public offices; this trend of more of openness continues until today.

Based on examples of Indonesian culinary and traditions such as *angpao* (bulk money on envelope during Eid Mubarak); fried noodles; *bakpao* (Chinese bun); *siomay/shumai* (a variety of Chinese dimsum); and *nasi goreng* (fried rice), such show how the Chinese remain vulnerable in this multiethnic country. This is true regardless of the survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting in December 2016, which found that only 0.8 percent of respondents “hated” ethnic Chinese (Tanaga, 2017). Related with the hatred toward Chinese-Indonesians, this researcher found another racial and offensive remark to Chinese-Indonesians from a member of the Jakarta’s Regional House Representative. An offensive epithet, “*Cina Anjing* - Chinese Dog” (Aritonang, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018), is one of the contemporary issues on racial discrimination from native Indonesians toward Chinese-Indonesians. In another issue, during the 2014 Presidential election, one of the candidates, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, was rumored to be of Chinese descent and this was used negatively against him. It triggered negative propaganda by his political rival to remake national chaos just like 1998. During the 1998 turmoil, many properties were signed with writings like “Muslim-owned” or “native-owned” on the storefront or their houses to state that they are not owned Chinese-Indonesians. Presenting a Chinese-Indonesian identity became a big mistake (trouble) in public

areas at that time. At the same time, there was anti-Chinese sentiment in Indonesia's post-Suharto era related to the rising of Transnational Muslim Movement who affiliated with the terrorist group ISIS and another Global Muslim movement (Sakai & Fauzia, 2014; Sulistiyanto, 2018; Watson, 2018; Widyaningrum & Dugis, 2018).

Sylvie Tanaga (2017) states that the Jakarta gubernatorial election is quite enough to make them renew their awareness of their identity as a minority. Tanaga highlights that being part of a minority group and being conscious of being a minority are two contrasting things. In the 2010 census, the Chinese ethnic groups in Indonesia are fewer in quantity, with only 1.2 percent of the population than other ethnic groups. Contestation of Chinese-Indonesians (Basuki Tjahaja Purnama – Ahok) generated negative sentiment against the Chinese ethnic group. The word *Cina* has a more pejorative connotation for some people. During the campaign, hate speech and sentiment using word *Cina* were a massive topic on social media (Anwar, 2019).

The increase in public awareness of Chinese-Indonesians as 100 percent Indonesian can be seen in their massive participation in the last three Indonesian general elections. Many Chinese-Indonesians ran for Legislative Member, Mayor, Regent, and Governor posts (Harjatanaya & Hoon, 2018; Warburton, 2018). At the same time however, Islamic populism has also increased, bringing with it anti-Chinese and anti-Christian sentiments (Hadiz, 2018; Hefner, 2018; Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018).

After 2012, racial sentiment from Islamist extremists always targeted Chinese-Indonesians; Chinese-Indonesians were considered not a part of the Indonesian Nationalist founders. Islamic populists accuse Chinese-Indonesians as traitors and threats to Indonesian integration (Mietzner & Muhtadi, 2018). In 2017, there was a big demonstration related to the blasphemy case of Ahok³ insulting the existence of Chinese-Indonesian in society. This also came with the rise of terror and libel against Chinese-Indonesians for being not fully Indonesian.

Recently, despite the rising discrimination toward Chinese-Indonesians, Chinese-Indonesians YouTubers are also on the rise in terms of popularity. When YouTube became popular in Indonesia, many Chinese-Indonesians became YouTubers, and they got the top rank on Indonesian YouTube. Eka Gustiwana, Kevin Anggara, Edho Zell, Chandra Liow, and the LDP group have amassed a considerable number of subscribers. Most have subscribers of more than 700,000, and some have even reached 1 million. All of them have Chinese ethnic backgrounds and compared to the other ethnic backgrounds such as Javanese or Arabic, Chinese-Indonesian YouTubers dominate the top ranks of the most subscribed YouTubers in Indonesia.

LDP, in their collaboration with another YouTubers like Kevin Anggara (Chinese-Indonesian), Eka Gustiwana (Chinese-Indonesian), and Aullion (Native Indonesian – Javanese/Pribumi), created a harmony of Chinese-Indonesians and native Indonesians redefining their identity as Indonesian youth during the most prominent timing: Independence Day celebration on August 2016.

Chinese-Indonesians Representation on Video *Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia*

Tipikal Anak Muda Indonesia (The Stereotypes of Young Indonesians) is a YouTube video produced by LDP (2016) in collaboration with other Indonesian YouTubers (Kevin Anggara, Aullion, and Eka Gustiwana). This video was uploaded to YouTube during the celebration of Indonesian Independence Day in 2016. It is 4 minutes and 57 seconds long, and viewed by 3,711,713 YouTube users (on 18 January 2017, 10.55 AM). The idea of this video is to describe the nationalism idea of young Indonesians. This video became the number 1 trending of Indonesian YouTube for almost two weeks in August 2016.

In the first scene, 00:01–00:27 timestamps, seven boys who are all Chinese- Indonesians looking, except Aullion (in which he is a *Pribumi*/ Native Indonesian-Javanese), form a line and bring the traditional instrument of Sundanese ethnicity called *Angklung*. They are wearing their elementary school uniforms, which is generally known as having the two colors of the Indonesian flag, red and white (fig. 2).



Figure 2: LDP with Kevin Anggara and Aullion playing *Angklung* (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 0:08)

They play the Papuan folksong, “Yamko Rambe Yamko.” The uniform, combined with the native Papuan traditional song, may tell the audience how all of the members of LDP are truly Indonesians. They want to show that their performance brings the Indonesian ambience. Their collaboration with Aullion, who is Javanese-looking, shows that Chinese-Indonesians still can work together with *pribumi*/Native Indonesians.

In this section, the harmony of Indonesians is shown as united. This harmony mainly shown by the symbols of Indonesian materials being shown in this footage (uniform, instrument, songs, ethnic background). Chinese-Indonesians, Javanese, Angklung (representation of Sundanese), and Yamko Rambe Yamko (representation of Papuans) become a concordance in a one-time action. LDP also told that Chinese-Indonesians are an integral part of Indonesia, which also creates a beautiful harmony in the sphere of Indonesian society. The concept of togetherness is also represented in this part by showing people can come together to create meaning about Indonesian nationalism and identity. This represents Chinese-Indonesians join together with other Indonesian ethnics to build harmony as a symbol of Indonesian nationalism.

In 00:42–00:57, the video shows a Chinese-Indonesian mother with her daughter. The mother asks her daughter not to be too mean. The next scene shows the traditional Indonesian greeting from the daughter to the parents by kissing her mother’s back of the hand to express politeness and respect to elders.

During this scene (fig. 2), LDP wants to show the contrast of how the younger sister (left) is more impolite than her older sister (right). The expression of the younger sister is illustrated as mad and disrespectful to her mother. This scene is typical activities before going to school. Indonesia firmly holds the Eastern value and local wisdom of respecting the elderly. Similar to Filipinos’ *pagmamano* as an honoring gesture, Indonesians, especially native Indonesians, widely practice this gesture before they go to school or to show affection. This practice is considered gesture of politeness for Indonesians.



Figure 2: Silly mom with younger sister (*left*), girl kissing hand their mother (*right*) (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 0:51)

On the other hand, this scene wants to compare how the younger generation have become more impolite, unlike the older sister who is portrayed as a polite daughter who respects her parents. In 00:58 timestamps, LDP accentuates this scene with the concept of an idol. In the beginning, LDP already shows the women drawing about her idol and singing about how she redefines the idol concept.

In the lyrics, LDP tells about how the older sister adoring her mother as an idol. It is in stark contrast with her younger sister, who favors pop artists as an idol and role model. LDP explains how Indonesian honor and respects their parents. At the same time, they also want to confirm that, as Chinese-Indonesians, they are just the same as other Indonesian natives, who uphold Indonesian values such as respecting their parents.

In the next scene (fig. 3), two boys wearing a sarong imitate the superhero's cap, while at the same time wear the "Damn I Love Indonesia" T-shirt. This particular T-shirt represents their nationalism as an Indonesian and also shows their support for another Chinese-Indonesian, Daniel Mananta, the brand owner. In the representation of their national identity, "Damn I love Indonesia" always uses the "Garuda," a mythical giant bird of Vishnu, the national emblem of the Republic of Indonesia in every shirt. Garuda is a sacred symbol of every Indonesian. Its statue is always put on display as the highest position of the Indonesian formal space. The statue is placed in the center, between the portrait of the Indonesian president and vice president. Garuda, as a symbol, also represents the national identity of the Indonesian people. The "Garuda Pancasila" (Hymn of Praising the Garuda" is the national and heroic song that always sung in every national day and other occasional events. Garuda is also considered a symbol of Indonesian nationalism and the spirit of becoming Indonesian (Wieringa, 2003). On the other hand, the choosing of the sarong may also represent Malay identity and cultural context. The sarong is widely used as a symbol of Indonesian textile regardless of the religion attribution.

The Damn I Love Indonesia T-shirt is the right choice to represent nationalism identity, yet still keeping in touch with contemporary style. From another point of view, Damn I Love Indonesia is very famous among Indonesian youths, especially among the middle to upper class because its brand and stores can easily be found in the top department stores and malls in the country.

The message of this scene is explicitly stated in the text. In relation to the version of the song: "We were dreaming of becoming Superman" and the T-shirt usage, LDP wants to tell the world that Indonesian youths can be a superhero like Garuda, the national identity, to make Indonesia great



Figure 3: Boys dressed in sarong and Damn I Love Indonesia T-Shirt. (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 1:06)

again. In this scene also shows two Chinese-Indonesian men who represent their nationalism and dream to make Indonesia great again.

The spirit of making Indonesia great again is considered as the new Indonesian nationalism jargon after 1998. After the financial crisis and some racial riots during 1997–1999, Indonesia recreated the spirit to become “Great Again” and lead Southeast Asia again. At the same time, the revival of the Islamic populist movement in Indonesia also became challenging for Chinese-Indonesians who revealed their “nationalism.” Chinese-Indonesians are considered as a threat to *Khilafah* (Global Muslim Governance) or Islamic State of Indonesia’s idea (Tanaga, 2017; Hamayotsu, 2018; Lindsey, 2018). LDP creates an easgoing counterdiscourse to recall that Chinese-Indonesians are an integral part of rebuilding the spirit of Indonesian nationalism, which is the same dream of many other Indonesians. The choosing of “Damn I Love Indonesia” is also a reminder to the Indonesian youths about the contribution of a Chinese-Indonesian (Daniel Mananta as an owner of T-shirt brand) in developing the symbol of new and more modern nationalism lifestyle.

Chinese-Indonesian Daily Life: A Personal Portrayal

The difference between LDP and the other Chinese-Indonesian YouTubers is that LDP always shows the slice of life in the Chinese-Indonesian perspective. The daily life of the Chinese-Indonesians always makes the native Indonesians curious about how Chinese-Indonesians are living their normal daily lives. LDP based their project on the everyday life of Chinese-

Indonesians. The silly mother and her children have become the common role of the video. Another common role in this LDP video is the young Chinese-Indonesian couple.

On 01:11 (fig. 4), the scene shows a young woman in her daily life with her notebook as simple as typical Indonesian native's looks: a simple room, just like those of other Indonesian teenagers. This setting highlights a young Chinese-Indonesians are just the same as other Indonesian youths. In this scene, the cameo also used Damn I Love Indonesia's T-shirt. It creates an accentuation of the Indonesian nationalism, the main idea of this video. Similar to the other scenes where a young Chinese-Indonesian man wears the Damn I Love Indonesia T-Shirt with another style.



Figure 4. LDP members wear the Damn I Love Indonesia T Shirt. (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 2:00)

The nationalism and Chinese-Indonesian identity are presented with great collaboration in all LDP members' daily life. LDP used the T-shirt as a nationalistic symbol to show that Chinese-Indonesians are also nationalists in their everyday life.

In another scene (fig. 5), LDP plays the traditional game of hide and seek or *Petak Umpet* (in Bahasa Indonesia). The usage of hide and seek tells the audience that Chinese-Indonesians are familiar with this kind of game, just as another native Indonesians in their younger years. At the same time, LDP also used the Pokémon Go application game, a Nintendo Mobile Games application, which became popular among Indonesian youths in 2016. The usage of Pokémon Go makes a highlight for Chinese-Indonesians, which are also millennial youths, just like the native Indonesians (Pribumi).



Figure 5. Chinese-Indonesians play hide and seek (left) and Pokemon Go app games (right). (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 1:15-1:18)

The discourse of the rising Islamic populist movement has pointed out how Chinese-Indonesians (Hamayotsu, 2018; Lindsey, 2018) have a different lifestyle to other Indonesian races. In this part, LDP denies this particular populist group's argument. Chinese-Indonesian youths also became addicted to Pokémon Go, just like other Indonesian youths. In the same segment, they also show how Chinese-Indonesians also play traditional games like hide and seek with other Indonesians, regardless of their races and physical appearance.

Chinese-Indonesian Values and Indonesian Values

In this video, LDP also concerns about the recent value of Indonesian society. In the areas of modernization and Westernization, some Indonesian values are changing. Traditional values like kissing the back of the hands, traditional dancing, and other Indonesian customs have become out of date for many Indonesian youths. LDP uses the traditional dancing of Jaipong (Sundanese traditional dance) to remind and deliver the message to their YouTube audience (fig. 6).



Figure 6. LDP practices Jaipong dance (left) and playing and singing *Ampar-ampar Pisang* (right). (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 1:35-1:50)

In the lyrics, LDP wrote this:

Walau jaman kini telah berubah, Jangan sampai nilai kita pun berubah. Boleh kekinian boleh update terus, tapi jangan lupa budaya kita. (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 1:31-1:47)

[Even though the times have changed, do not ever let our values be changed. We can still be in the present and keeping up [with the modern cultures], but do not ever forget our own culture.]

In the lyrics, they deliver the reason and main idea of this video about nationalism in the modern era: even if we become an up to date and modern youths, we should preserve our cultures and values.

LDP delivers the message with complete action of detailed Indonesian

customs. LDP used the “Ampar-ampar Pisang” song with their folk game to remind the folk games for Indonesian children in school. Ampar–ampar Pisang is a Bornean folksong and commonly sung by Indonesian children in the school in the 1990s.

LDP used the lyrics to create a satire to modern generations about the values. “Dulu main ampar–ampar pisang, sekarang kita main Instagram” (We used to play Ampar–ampar Pisang, but we are now busy playing Instagram). LDP wants to highlight how the values of the millennial generation have already changed and how the typical teenager nowadays does not know about “Ampar-ampar Pisang.” LDP satirizes the social reality about teenager life as depicted on Instagram. LDP gently satirizes funny expressions during the playing of Ampar-ampar Pisang.

This scene also represents how Chinese-Indonesians share the same values and cultures with the native Indonesians. It shows the “new knowledge” that Chinese-Indonesians also usually plays the Ampar-ampar Pisang in their daily life. LDP delivers the message about no differences between the Chinese-Indonesian and native Indonesians in everyday life.

In another scene, LDP shows their school life. They are similar to other native Indonesians who sing folksongs and play the recorder during art classes (fig. 7). The folksong on the screen wants to describe how the Chinese-Indonesians also respect Indonesian cultures and traditions. It confirms that Chinese-Indonesians are also 100 percent Indonesian.



Figure 7. LDP playing recorder (left) and situation of the Art class (right) (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 2:48:2:52)

Message About Unity in Diversity

In the next scene, LDP wants to portray the passion and pride of becoming an Indonesian. LDP, in collaboration with young Indonesian Musician, Eka Gustiwana, sing together and deliver the message about proud to be Indonesian wherever they are working (and living) now. The lyrics are:

Tapi jangan lupa siapa kita, darimana kita lahir, di mana kita berdiri. Bagi yang sedang di negeri tetangga, harumkan nama Indonesia kita. Bagi yang berkarya di negeri tetangga, jangan lupakan Indonesia. (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 3:13-3:40)

[But do not forget our identity, where we were born, where we are now. For those of you who are in foreign countries, make known the name of our beloved Indonesia. For those of you who are outside the country, do not forget Indonesia.]

It delivers the message that Chinese-Indonesians also bear their own Indonesian identity. From another perspective, LDP, as the creator of the video, wants the Indonesian diaspora to be proud of and to assert their status as Indonesian. The main message is to tell the world how beautiful Indonesia is.

LDP not only delivers the message for Indonesian who lived in Indonesia but also to the Indonesian diaspora who have been living abroad. From 1950 to 1998, and mostly after 1998, millions of Chinese-Indonesians have lived in exile, fleeing from the persecution due to their Chinese-Indonesian status (Wibowo, 2001). The majority of them fled to the Netherlands, mostly in The Hague. Other Chinese-Indonesians chose to live in Singapore, the United States of America, Hong Kong, and Australia for security reasons. LDP believes that the YouTube video can spread the Indonesian nationalism value and deliver the message about Indonesia to the Indonesian diaspora, who still love the country and are proud to be Indonesian. Research even shows that most of the Indonesian diaspora still love Indonesia and proud to be an Indonesian (Setianto, 2016).

LDP ended their video by singing “Indonesia Tanah Air Beta” (Indonesia, My Homeland) together. In this scene, they are seen hand in hand and wearing their traditional Indonesian dress. LDP wants to deliver a message about unity on diversity, symbolized by the variety of traditional Indonesian dresses (fig. 8).



Figure 8. LDP playing recorder (left) and situation of the Art class (right). (LASTDAY Productions, 2016, 4:00)

In the last scene, LDP inserts the message from Indonesian president, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, which states that the president wants the young generations, especially the millennials, to preserve Indonesian traditions such as folksong.

Conclusion

LDP, as a YouTube content creator, wants to produce creative content which can raise the nationalism of Indonesian youths. Even though all of the members are Chinese-Indonesians, they want to show how the Chinese-Indonesians are also 100 percent Indonesian. Millennial generations who are active internet users can gather the message from LDP with their style. Social media platforms such as YouTube are an excellent medium to spread nationalistic ideas for the young and millennial generations. LDP, whose members are in the minority spectrum based on ethnicity (Chinese-Indonesian), uses YouTube as an alternative media for content creators who cannot access mainstream discourse media like TV and other conventional media.

LDP also shows how Chinese-Indonesians are the same as other native Indonesians in daily life. Even though some Indonesians have bad memories of the racial issue, LDP is still proud to be an Indonesian. Even when Indonesians are now facing the rise of Islamic populism, which considers ethnic Chinese as the enemy of Islam, LDP, as one of the representations of Chinese-Indonesian youths, spreads the narrative of Chinese-Indonesians as an integral part of Indonesia. The Chinese-Indonesian young generation also plays a significant influence on the generation younger than they are. This is highlighted by their achievement of trending on Indonesian YouTube for almost two weeks. They create a counterdiscourse on the blasphemy of Chinese-Indonesians using alternative media which are mass-level, rapid, and easily accessible among Indonesian youths.

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Endnotes

¹ “*Ganyang Malaysia*”- *Lit* Eat Malaysian!, or Crash the Malaysian! are Indonesian Propaganda Campaign to show the ultra-nationalism of Indonesian against the claim of Malaysia as Supreme Malay. This idea rooted from Sukarno, Indonesian founding father in 1964 on Indonesia- Malaysia confrontation. This campaign claimed as how Indonesian fighting for their ideal nationalism. This campaign being republished and became the highlight in many Indonesian and Malaysian media, especially after the rising of internet media after 2005. There are also many social media such as topix.com (online forum media based on Malaysia) or kaskus.com (Indonesian largest online community) that caused the nationalism discourse to become viral. Majority of their discussions about nationalism in both websites are classified as blind nationalism. Many people in both forums (from both countries) used provocation by hate speech and ultra-nationalism.

² Chinese-Indonesian have a strong root with *Peranakan* culture. They look skin-lighter than another Indonesian native, but darker compare to original Chinese. They have active assimilation with Malay culture during the Dutch Colonial period. Majority of them speak Bahasa Indonesia and other Indonesian local languages. Especially after 1966, the Chinese language is banned from being used in the school in Indonesia. Most of the Chinese Indonesian work as a trader and considerably richer than other native Indonesian. Most of Chinese Indonesian following Christianity and Buddhism rather than Muslim, the majority faith of native Indonesian.

³ Ahok, or in his Indonesian name Basuki Tjahaja Purnama is Former Governor of Metropolitan Jakarta, capital of Indonesia. He is Chinese-Indonesian and associated with Joko Widodo, the Indonesian President. He loses their position as Governor for his rival Arab-Indonesian, Anies Baswedan in 2017 election. He got charges of blasphemy case on the insulting verse of Koran, Islamic Bible. Plenty demonstration on Jakarta before the 2017 election and some of demanding are want to kill Ahok and other Chinese-Indonesian. (more detail on <https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2016/11/05/rally-erupts-in-violence.html>)

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About the Authors

DANIEL SUSILO is an Assistant Professor at the School of Communications Science, Universitas Multimedia Nusantara, Indonesia. He is a recipient of a national grant for research on Indonesian cinema and representation on digital media. Susilo also teaches Research Methods in Communication and Theories of Human Communication. He also graduated from a short course on Research in Humanities conducted by Vrije University Amsterdam and Leiden University, Netherlands (corresponding author: daniel.susilo@umn.ac.id).

RAHMA SUGIHARTATI is an Associate Professor in the Department of Information and Library Science at Airlangga University. She supervises some 10 PhD students on related topics on Discourse, Pop Culture, Subculture, and Digital Culture. She is a recipient of national research grants from Indonesian Ministry of Research and Higher Education for digital media research. She also served as reviewer on many reputable international journals.

